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*Introduction*

**Clientelism or bureaucracy**

In a book about the development of the state, Göran Therborn wrote, from a neo-Marxist point of view, that “[i]n the historical development of this social dynamic a number of temporalities affect the organization of the state” (1978). However, neo-Marxists are not the only ones who have recognized that temporalities affect the organization of the state. In a standard text about the state, written from a neo-Weberian angle, Gianfranco Poggi wrote that “the particular course taken by the Western state was a highly contingent affair” (1990:105) and that the development of particular states has to be understood with the emphasis being put upon contingency (ibid. 99-100).

Meanwhile, Therborn and Poggi have different temporalities and contingencies in mind: For Therborn, as for other neo-Marxists, the differences between particular states have to be understood with reference to social classes and, specifically, to the different rhythms of two politicized class struggles: one between feudal lords and the capitalist bourgeoisie and the other between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (cf. Mann, 1993:45). For Poggi and the neo-Weberians, it is, rather, the temporalities of the state system and the availability of state models that provide the key to understanding the course taken by particular states.

Advocates of each theoretical tradition argue in a rather exclusive fashion as though there were only classes or only states surrounding a particular state. In real situations, however, social classes and other states together constitute parts of the organizational environment of a particular state and interact in ways that are not clearly understood. And, of course, the environments in which the states exist are themselves not only the temporalities of classes and other states. That is the temporalities of other social formations, like voluntary organizations and families, or of social
processes, such as urbanization or the spread of literacy, which are usually not related to the development of the state, are important in understanding it.

There is broad agreement that Swedish public bureaucracies possess two kinds of autonomy: autonomy from the central state and autonomy from the particularities of civil life. Apart from these two, there is a third that has been taken for granted in Sweden, namely, that political parties do not penetrate into public bureaucracies. There are no sections of political parties inside the bureaucracy in Sweden. In these respects, the Greek state can be said to be the opposite. The political command of state bureaucracies through the central state is exhaustive. Ministers are usually responsible for and intervene in many activities that could usually be defined as being bureaucratic rather than political in other countries. For instance, it is not uncommon that changes in ministerial posts can lead to changes in the chains of authority inside the bureaucracy. State authorities are strongly influenced by the particularities of civil life and political parties are intertwined with state authorities to a degree unknown in Scandinavia. It can, for instance, take just a few moments to understand the political sympathies of civil servants in Greece, whilst in Sweden even after many years one may still only be able to make qualified guesses about them.

People from outside Sweden should probably not hesitate to ask the question "Is there no clientelism in Sweden?", having it in mind that one can mean the existence of fascist practices without fascist parties and, if you like, of a kind of socialist politics without socialist parties. To avoid the tendency of "Western" intellectuals to contrast idealized political models with corrupt practices elsewhere, I will comment briefly upon this question.

To my knowledge, no research question about clientelism in modern times has ever been addressed by Swedish academia. My personal impression is that some practices that are defined as being clientelistic elsewhere have not been defined as such in Sweden, and that therefore one would probably find more particularism than is generally supposed. Apart from which, the practice of clientelism is a relatively unknown one. Whilst reviewing the major sociological works
on the Swedish state recently, I did not find the words clientelism or political patronage named at all (Papakostas, 1997). Instead, young sociologists seem to be more concerned about problems stemming from the impersonal implementation of universalistic bureaucratic rules and the transformation of individuals into administrative cases (see Johansson, 1992), questions that researchers in other parts of the world would define as luxuries. The Swedish language does not have an appropriate word for clientelism, and when journalists refer to the clientelism in other countries in major newspapers or on television, they usually have to add that this is a practice where politicians exchange favors for political support.

Evidence from scientific research suggests that Swedish bureaucracy works in a relatively universalistic manner. Some of those cases where a practice could be defined as clientelistic elsewhere would be defined in terms of administrative efficiency in Sweden, rather than in terms of micropolitics. The character of the discourse in public debates tends to be bureaucratic and rational rather than political and, although power struggles between particularistic or class interests are essential in understanding the form and the content of state institutions (Ahrne, 1989; Korpi, 1983; Therborn, 1989), the implementation of the rules follows universalistic patterns and is not intermediated through political patronage. According to a standard text about the Swedish public administration, no patronage or spoils system has existed in modern times (Heckscher, 1958) and a strong legalistic tradition of loyalty to the government and of serving public interest has dominated the civil service (Mellbourn, 1979, cf. Rothstein, 1996:80).

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1 For instance, recruitment to AMS (the National Labor Market Board, the authority for the implementation of the active labor market policy, a cornerstone of Social Democratic policy and the Swedish Model after the Second World War) did not follow universalistic rules. It was based mostly on ideological commitment to Social Democracy, but the motivation given was that of administrative efficiency (Rothstein, 1996:116-130). When historians write about
Social scientists studying the labor movements know that asking counterfactual questions like Sombart's "Why is there no socialism in the United States?" (Sombart, [1906], 1976), could be quite wrong and it would probably be a better research strategy to explain how the actual outcomes came into being "as the gradual crystallization of a limited array of patterns out of broad spectrum of possibilities" (Zolberg, 1986:401). My major concern is to answer questions stated factually, such as why state rules came to be applied in a universalistic rather than in a particularistic manner and why political parties became horizontal organizations based on class rather than vertical networks. I use the expression *rather than* with the intention of avoiding the fallacy of retrospective determinism and of interpreting actual materialized outcomes as the inevitable outcomes of antecedent factors. At certain points in time the social structure leaves several degrees of freedom for the actual outcome, opening up a broad array of possibilities.

When Werner Sombart asked his question about socialism in the United States, he had the predictions of the marxian doctrine in mind. He believed that socialism was inevitable in modern capitalist industrial societies and he wanted to explain the temporal lateness of the development of class-consciousness in the United States. Asking a similar question about clientelism in Scandinavia, or faced with fact as in the case of Mediterranean Europe, one cannot rely upon strong propositions derived theoretically. There is no theory that predicts the inevitability of clientelism, although advocates of the modernization theory would be expected to predict that it would disappear as societies become more modern.

Clientelism is, however, not theoretically associated with a particular type of society, although some people think that it is more typical in underdeveloped societies or that it depends on some kind of mystical preservation of their traditions. It is not unusual, for instance, to find that

class or family recruitment in earlier periods, they usually explain it by referring to social capital: individuals were "socialized" in the administrative culture of these families (see Frohnert, 1993:71).
clientelism in Greece is attributed to the oriental values stemming from its Ottoman past, or even to the patrimonial structure of the Byzantine state. Such a narrow cultural explanation falls far short of the mark when clientelism is evident in many societies without an "oriental" past. Generally cultural explanations become more problematic when the practice of clientelism is found in societies belonging to very different cultural zones, independently of how these cultural zones are defined. While reviewing the literature on clientelism, Eisenstadt and Roninger (1980) mention different degrees of clientelist practice in areas as culturally different as Mediterranean Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, southeastern Asia, Japan, USA, the former USSR and parts of Africa.

If culture fails to explain clientelism, could economic development do better? Would people living in a prosperous material world with a high standard of living become engaged in clientelist exchanges? One might anticipate that the answers would be yes to the first question and no to the second, and I certainly believe that there is more behind economic explanations than cultural ones. But this is not the whole truth: Clientelist practices are not a common phenomenon in all economically underdeveloped societies, while they can also be found in prosperous ones. Examining societies where clientelism is practiced, one finds that the poorest are not the most common practitioners. A detailed Greek historiographic study of the work mobility of the urban poor reports, for instance, that about 80 percent of the times that people commenced or changed work was attributable to kinship networks and not to political intermediation (Pizanias, 1993). Even looking at what kinds of practices are associated with clientelism, one can see that they are not purely economic. Intermediating the entrance to working life is a usual clientelist practice, but not the only one. In reality, nearly all administrative matters can be transformed into clientelist practices. Clientelism is more of a social and political phenomenon than an economic or cultural one and the Greek experience (and of course the experience from other countries, cf. Eisenstadt
and Roninger, 1980:46) suggests that it does not automatically disappear with economic development.

On the other hand, social scientists have taken the development of universalistic state structures as being something natural, something that automatically comes with development, defined as economic development, modernity, etc. But this assumption becomes problematic when such evolutionary adaptation of social structures to development is so rare that it is counterproductive to keep the assumption. A closer reading of the historical facts and the sequences of development in Europe suffices to be able contradict such an explanation. As a Swedish political scientist has correctly observed (Blomqvist, 1992), the development and maintenance of universalistic state structures has to be explained as well as the development of particularistic state structures, and I think it is more difficult to explain the development of the universalistic state taken for granted in a few quite atypical societies in the world. Generally speaking, I do not think that "the bureaucratization of the world" is the big problem in some countries, but exactly the opposite: there is too little bureaucracy, and what exists does not function well.

**The contours of a macrosociological explanation**

I will try to sketch the contours of a macrosociological explanation by using pairs of contrasts between the Swedish and Greek sequences of development to illustrate the arguments. The comparison between Sweden and Greece provides the researcher with a situation that is reminiscent of multiple natural simultaneous experiments enabling one to analyze different trajectories that lead to the development of predominantly universalistic structures on one side and to a mixture of universalistic and particularistic ones on the other. Meanwhile, to interpret social practices as the outcome of history is the same fallacy as saying that culture or economy alone explain everything. The elements in history that were important must be defined. Explaining present practices with reference to historical legacies that have persisted for centuries,
a popular research activity in some variants of historical institutionalism (see Putnam, [1993], or Demerzis, [1994], for an analogous explanation of the modern political culture in Greece), is more problematic as there has been a plurality of social forms in past centuries and a low rate of innovation of new social forms. Whatever the accepted practices were, someone could find some roots for them in the past. The problem is not to show that there is a legacy from the past or that there is some kind of continuity between present and past practices, but instead to examine how history makes some of these forms dominant and suppresses others (compare with the notion of “suppressed alternatives,” Moore, 1978). Thus, for example, there were many forms of particularism in the early modern Swedish state and among them patronage, but many of them disappeared in the course of time and gave way to more universalistic practices. On the other hand, the ambition to create a universalistic state was present in Greece from the time of the national liberation, but in the course of modernization Greece did not manage to free itself of the particularist elements, as was possible in Sweden. So, looking at both Greece and Sweden from the point of view of the spectrum of possible alternatives, these societies were more similar historically that has been supposed. They became more different as this spectrum of alternatives was gradually narrowed down to the established alternatives.

In order to make my arguments clear, I will use a comparative logic in which historical outcomes are understood with reference to the concept of timing and by placing them at the intersections of social processes with different temporalities. In the words of an art historian, this is like seeing historical outcomes as the product of many disparate wheels of fortune (Kubler 1962). This type of comparison has been used in major macrosociological comparative works. There are many social processes and plenty of ways to describe and analyze them. My concern is

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about organizational processes in a broad sense and my approach is materialistic — similar to Michael Mann’s "organizational materialism" (Mann, 1993:36). The underlying theoretical theme is based on the idea of the social landscape developed by Göran Ahrne (1990, 1994) and the theoretical movement of organizational realism. One of the ideas behind these concepts is that organizations are the tissue of social life and that social phenomena should be understood primarily with reference to the organizations and the relations between them, and not with reference to an all encompassing system or to a logic intrinsic to societies. Combining Kubler’s metaphor of the disparate wheels of fortune with the idea of the social landscape, historical outcomes appear to be the outcome of the relative timing and the historical conjunctures of four histories with different temporalities: the histories of states, enterprises, voluntary associations and families. Thus one must understand the forms of the state in terms of the state’s relations to other organizational contexts. In a book about modernization in general, and about state modernization in particular, Marion J. Levy writes that:

No activities of the members of any governments can be fully understood in terms of the structures of the governments alone. The structure of political allocation in terms of which the members of the society operate in organizational contexts other than that of government are always to some extent relevant to the governmental context itself. (Levy, [1966], 1996: 394).

I define such an organizational context as a constellation of organizations (Ahrne & Papakostas, 1994) and I will try to understand the development of state structures in Sweden and Greece with reference to their respective constellations.

Clientelism is usually studied as a relation between individuals, an asymmetric relation between a patron and a client, or as a political exchange with unequal power resources. The cultural frame for this relation has been the major focus of the analyses. The literature on clientelism, with its deep roots in social anthropology, has tried to understand clientelism as a phenomenon stemming from the morals or cultural codes of small “backward” societies. With few exceptions,
the whole field of research could be called "the popular roots of clientelist practices". The cultural approach often mystifies clientelism by insisting on the codes of honor or the general view of life in "exotic cultures". Without denying that local cultures have some impact, I will follow the way of macroanalysis and move from the powerful organizations to the local community. I will try to perceive clientelism as a problem of "frontier fortification" and of "intertwining" between different types of organizations where complicated historical sequences of organization establishment create different frontiers and intertwining between different types of relatively "modern" organizations. Perceived from this angle, both clientelist and universalistic practices are consequences of different historical ways of drawing up organizational frontiers. With reference to clientelism, this means combining and going beyond two other traditions in social science: one that perceives clientelism as an organizational attribute of the state (a specific form of particularism) and one that views it as an organizational attribute of a political party. As the PASOK experience in Greece has shown, clientelist practices do not disappear when the organizational form of the governing party becomes bureaucratic, although they do probably change to what has been referred as "bureaucratic clientelism". Clientelism in particular and particularism in general are seen in this way, that is, not as problems of organizational form for the state or a political party, but as problems of intertwining between social organizations operating with different logic. Or, if we use concepts from modernization theory, this is a problem of incomplete differentiation of central social conglomerates.

I will also use the metaphor of *vacancy chains* (White, 1970) to illustrate how, at different times, some sequences of organizational establishment create open spaces where certain social practices can flourish, while some other sequences do not allow such openings to appear. Two reservations must, however, be made. In the strict vacancy chains model, effects move through the system because moving individuals leave an opening behind them. Organizations do not have to leave an opening behind them when they expand to a new space. The chain is short. The other
reservation is the problem of intertwining. In new social spaces social practices and organizational principles can become entwined in a plurality of forms that is impossible in vacancy chain models, where one person occupies the open position. For instance, the “organizational culture” of modern Swedish welfare authorities seems to be characterized by a unity of bureaucratic remoteness and popular proximity. Looking back at the organizational history of Swedish modern authorities, one finds that they have resulted from the intertwining of social movements and weberian style bureaucracies (Lindqvist, 1990). In public authorities in Greece you do not find this unity of familiarity and bureaucratic remoteness. Instead, they are characterized by exclusivity. Access to familiarity inside bureaucracies is possible through chains of networks to a degree that is unknown in Scandinavia and this can certainly not be claimed to be unfamiliar to the average Greek, but otherwise, Greeks face bureaucratic indifference to a degree unknown in Scandinavia. It seems to me that this organizational culture results from historical coincidence and the intertwining of kinship, or extended families, and bureaucracy. This is one side of the particularism in Greek authorities. The other is the intertwining of political parties and state bureaucracies. I will use some concepts from relational sociology (Tilly, 1998) to analyze the problem of intertwining.

The differences between the Swedish and the Greek cases I have mentioned up to now can be summarized within four analytically distinct, but in reality highly interrelated boundary relations. The first of these includes relations between the realm of politics and the realm of the state. One aspect of these relations concerns the degree of organizational differentiation between the realm of politics and the realm of the state.\(^3\) In ideal-typical situations these can be completely separated

\(^3\) I use the term the realm of politics instead of the realm of government that has been used in typologies of comparative politics intentionally to point out that political parties can influence bureaucratic matters without necessarily being in government position.
or completely interlocked, but in real situations there can neither be complete separation nor complete interlocking; it is rather a question of degree than of category. Thus, on a scale, I would place Sweden towards the separation end and Greece towards the interlocking end. Another dimension of the same topic concerns the relations of domination between the above-mentioned realms. Here again there can be cases where the subordination of the state to politics or its opposite, the complete bureaucratization of politics, is observed. Generally speaking though, in countries with democratic traditions like Greece and Sweden, there is a balanced situation between these absolutes. Apart from which, there are particular deviations from this pattern. In Greece the government is formally the head of the state, while in Sweden the principle of the administrative autonomy of state authorities is institutionalized. In reality this difference is not as big as it looks at first sight because it is known that Swedish ministers exercise informal control over the state authorities, but the idea of the primacy of politics exists in Greece, both as an element in the political culture and as a guiding principle in citizens’ orientations towards the state.

The second set of boundary relations is usually mentioned as the problem of the insulation of the state bureaucracy from the particularities of civil life (Bendix, [1964], 1996:139-141). One aspect of insulation is that discussed above which is achieved through the separation of the realms of politics and the state. Other aspects of the same problem concern the insulation of state activities from economic activities (keeping the specialists of exchange outside the state) and insulation against kinship or localism. The totally insulated state is of course an ideal-typical construction. In the real world, states can be characterized as being predominantly universalistic or predominantly particularistic (Levy, [1966] 1996: 141).

Generally speaking there are two ways of creating insulation: through institutional devices and through social distinctions or social differentiation. Laws forbidding public employees to have a second occupation or to work at their place of origin are examples of administrative devices.
Recruitment on the basis of social distinctions, for instance recruiting from different religious groups than that of the population as a whole or recruiting from a special social stratum are examples of creating insulation through social differentiation. The Greek state is characterized by a high degree of institutional devices, and this has been particularly evident this century, but on the other hand, it is defectively insulated from civil life, in modern terminology, it is embedded in social relations. In Sweden one finds surprisingly few institutional safeguards intended to create distance between the state and its surroundings, but on the other hand the state is socially insulated.

The third topic is related to the *modes of inclusion* of the lower social classes into national politics. One must distinguish here between the *integrative* and the *incorporative* modes of inclusion (Mouzelis, 1986:73-94). The integrative mode denotes a horizontal and autonomous inclusion as took place in several of the capitalist core countries while the second mode denotes the vertical and less autonomous, plebiscitarian and paternalistic fashion that characterized the inclusion in the capitalist semi-periphery. Here clientelism is seen as one of the historical subtypes of the second mode, populism being the other. The exchange of favors for votes is common in both subtypes, but there is a clear distinction between them in regard to the organizational forms.

The fourth topic is the form of the state-citizen relations. Citizenship is usually studied from a comparative perspective by using Marshall's distinction between political, economic and social rights and it is usually the quantitative aspects of the latter that are studied in a comparative perspective by relating them to the power resources of the major social actors (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, the qualitative aspects of the state-citizen relations have not been studied and the researcher can not rely on an existing conceptual framework to illustrate differences between states. Thus I elaborate this with the categories I took in the description above.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations between state and politics</th>
<th>GREECE</th>
<th>SWEDEN</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Towards interlocking</td>
<td>Towards differentiation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primacy of politics</td>
<td>Balanced differentiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insulation of the state</td>
<td>Many institutional devices</td>
<td>Few institutional devices</td>
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<td></td>
<td>High social penetration</td>
<td>Socially created insulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mode of inclusion</td>
<td>Incorporation through controlled associations and vertical networks</td>
<td>Integration through autonomous associations and horizontal representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of state-citizen relations</td>
<td>Bureaucratic indifference</td>
<td>Bureaucratic distance united</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>But with relational access</td>
<td>with popular proximity</td>
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Having defined the major aspects in which the Swedish and the Greek cases differ, we shall turn our attention to the social landscape in these countries, examine the temporalities that may account for them and give some tentative answers to the questions raised.

*The disparate sequences of development, the discontinuities of modernization and the state*

The expansion of the state and the extension of the franchise

Speaking in general terms, Greece belongs to the group of countries that, introduced modern institutions in a primary precapitalist social formation after the end of the Napoleonic Wars and throughout the nineteenth century. These institutions were of two kinds: modern institutions for political representation and a modern state. The political reforms were inspired by ideas associated with the French revolution and, in contrast to what happened in other European countries, it is surprising to see how easily modern institutions for political representation got a strong foothold in Greek society. Male suffrage was introduced without any major limitations in 1844. Modern constitutions guaranteeing liberal freedom date from about the same time and the parliamentary principle of appointing governments was introduced in the 1870s.
Creating a modern state based on its west European prototype proved to be more difficult. In contrast to what happened in countries like Italy, the process of administrative unification lasted for about one hundred years. On the whole, the process of creating state organizations was characterized by unevenness. Building military and police forces and, to a degree, courts was relatively easy, but establishing a school system for primary education and of tax authorities lagged behind. In this respect, the non-uniformity of the school system is quite striking. Until recently, primary education excluded a relatively large proportion of the population, while, proportionally, Greek universities produced more students than economically advanced countries. About forty percent of those students were students of law, and as the labor marked could not absorb them, they usually turned to politics. Borrowing blueprints from west Europe, they gave the state an extremely legal-formalistic character and implanted the widespread idea that social and political problems are juridical problems that can be solved by the law. Many of the roots of the bureaucratic indifference in Greek authorities mentioned earlier can be found there.

As is well known, the west European state is historically based on taxation (Tilly, 1990). The need for resources forced kings to establish authorities to register and collect taxes that were necessary in war-making. This laid the ground for the infra-structural power of the state (Mann, 1993). Authorities built in periods of war were then used to penetrate social life and logistically implement decisions. At the same time, direct relations between the state and its inhabitants were established, but not without protests, revolts and negotiations that defined the content of citizenship. For reasons I will not discuss here, the Greek state was slow in this vertical

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4 Mainly the availability of European loans in the nineteenth century, the slow economic development and the low extraction capacity of the state.
penetration of civil life. In this matter, the Greek state was a weak one and it left a space between itself and its inhabitants.\textsuperscript{5}

In contrast, the political institutions spread through the country at a high pace and gained a strong foothold in Greek society. It is reported that in a referendum in 1863, six out of ten men of age 20 to 65 voted, a percentage that was only attained fifty years later in Sweden. This penetration was entire and thorough. For instance, the English historian W. Miller begins the chapter on politics in his treatise on Greece by writing: “It is impossible to write about Greek life, whether in town or country, without saying something on the subject of politics; for they affect every profession, every trade and almost every family to a degree unknown in other lands” (Miller, 1905:21). Of course this is not a quality of the Greek character or of a distinct Greek culture. Historically, political parties based on universal male suffrage came before bureaucracy in Greece and occupied the space between the state and the social life. As a consequence, peoples’ concerns were defined as being a political matter, making it impossible to depersonalize and define them as bureaucratic cases. As we shall see later, political parties also became intertwined in this space with families and aggregated the interests of citizens as family interests and not as class or occupational interests. In this way, interests and even citizens’ concerns were made manifold – each family had its own interests – which made it almost impossible to treat them with bureaucratic rules based on the average individual. Having gained this structural advantage in civil life too, the political parties and politicians established a strong foothold inside and an iron hand over state authorities when in government.

\textsuperscript{5} The collection of taxes was initially accomplished through tax farming and later, when it was bureaucratized, it did not succeed in becoming effective. An estimated 30-35\% of the GNP still remains untaxed.
The formation of the Swedish state followed a different path of development. Generally speaking, Sweden belongs to that group of countries where a state was created first that was transformed after a considerable time lag into a modern democratic state. While state formation took place in a precapitalist social context, the transformation of the state was conducted after the period of rapid and thorough industrialization. In almost all respects the administrative unification was accomplished in the early modern era. Problems like the unification of the judicial system, the incorporation of the church under the state and the homogenization of the population were solved before the cultural and the industrial revolutions and the social cleavages they created could affect their outcome. A system by which to register the population and its resources was established early on by using the organization of the church, which facilitated the collection of taxes and simultaneously created direct relations between the state and its subjects (Nilsson, 1990:56-104). The church was also used to administer the school system, which, by the middle of the nineteenth century, provided nearly all children of school age with access to primary school education. A generation later it had transformed the literacy level of the population to ninety percent, enhancing its overall organizational capacity. If the early political representation is the outstanding feature of the Greek state building process, then mass education, taxation and the regulations of social life associated with it qualify as the corresponding features of the Swedish one. These different features gave citizenship a distinct tinge in each country. Citizenship rights in Greece were a result of an isomorphic process and made citizenship legal-formalistic. In Sweden they were the result of tax negotiations as the state expanded and citizenship became substantial.

Thus in Sweden the expansion of the state and the extension of the franchise to the lower classes followed the opposite sequence to that in Greece. In this respect, the early modern

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6 For the relation between literacy and organizational capacity, see Arthur Stinchcombe (1965).
Swedish state is unique. It penetrated many aspects of its subjects' lives, and regulated and in many occasions actually changed social relations to a degree that states established later never managed to achieve. The Swedish state was one that could intervene in social life and logistically implement its decisions because the early expansion equipped it with the capacity to collect information and control transactions (Nilsson, 1990). It also established direct relations between the state and its subjects at a time when there were no other viable alternatives that could be placed at the interstices between the state and the people. The political parties and the social movements associated with the extension of suffrage and the industrialization of the country that grew at the turn of the century never found a foothold from which to mediate the relation between the citizen and the state. The activities of the state and of mass politics became balanced and differentiated, thereby, at least in principle, leaving the problem of political domination of the state untouched by retaining the early established tradition of administrative independence. The major task of the mass parties and the social movements became the definition and aggregation of citizens' interests. And, as the state did not intervene in the social question, the labor movement — and to a lesser degree other social movements — tried to solve the everyday problems of the working-class by creating a whole world of social insurance organizations located very near the everyday experience of the people. Later on when these social organizations became part of the welfare state, they transmitted the popular proximity they had previously acquired into the welfare state, making a bureaucracy that was sensitive to popular feelings and demands.

While the process of state building was accomplished early on, the political representation was rather exclusive up to the end of the industrialization. In 1890, a year that falls in the middle of the period of rapid industrialization between 1870 and 1910, only one in four adult males had the right to vote and just one in ten actually voted (Carlsson, 1953:14, 23-25). The political parties in existence at that time were exclusive class-parties, self-organized without the interference of other
social groups. Their social base was restricted to the rich quarters of the cities and the landowning peasants. These political parties are known in Swedish as *Riksdagspartier* – parliament parties – one meaning of which is that they functioned inside the parliament excluding the vast majority of the proletarianized peasants and the industrial workers. Outside the parliament, in the open social spaces that were left between the class-exclusive parties, the organization-tolerant non-intervening state and the nuclear family, a whole world of independent political and social movements found fertile ground in which to develop by using the high organizational capacity of the excluded social strata (Papakostas, 1995). These movements defined and aggregated the interests of the citizens in categorical terms, largely according to class and occupation. They presented the social demands and needs of specific social groups to the bureaucracy in categorical terms, making it easier to construct bureaucratic rules based on averages within these categories. Citizens’ multiple and in many ways exceptional demands and needs could thus be transformed into routine cases with few exceptions.

**The social location of the leading classes in the state and social life**

The process of state formation occurred prior to that of economic development in both countries. Meanwhile the mechanisms by which capital was accumulated and the structure of the ruling classes were quite different. As Constantin Tsoucalas has pointed out, a major characteristic of the Greek society after the liberation was the absence of a stabilized ruling class that could use exploitative mechanisms outside the state to accumulate capital. In the absence of such mechanisms, old nobles turned *en maste* towards the state, the most important device for the collection and distribution of economic surplus at that time (Tsoucalas, 1978). Thus state and economic activity were intertwined from the beginning and transmitted the exchange codes and morals from the latter to the former.

In Sweden, where aristocracy had exclusive rights to the higher state positions and where being a civil servant almost exclusively implied that one was of aristocratic origin, the
The intertwining of state and class was more pervasive, making the Swedish state a particularistic class state of a kind that the Greek state never was. For instance, in a study of the social origin of the civil servants in three central state authorities between 1810 and 1870 it has been reported that 70 to 84 percent of the civil servants were sons of other civil servants, most of whom were of aristocratic origin (Nilsson, 1997:21). The state was built on one side of a deep social cleavage and created distance between the incumbents of state positions and the rest of the population. This, of course, did not mean a bureaucratic distinction between the position and the incumbent. As Göran Therborn (1989) has pointed out, this became possible later in a developed capitalist economy when the owners of state positions became state employees (cf. Rothstein, 1998).

In the course of the time, starting from the second half of the nineteenth century in a period when the bourgeoisie began to develop its own economic base and did not depend on the state for its markets (Tilton, 1974:68), the strong intertwining of class and state was loosened in Sweden. Whilst the leading classes in Greece turned early on en masse from economic activities towards the state, in Sweden a weaker movement was observed in the opposite direction. Torbjörn Nilsson has reported in a new study that, as the economy expanded during the second half of the nineteenth century, many civil servants became industrialists and tradesmen (Nilsson, 1999). But the early entwining of state and class left behind traces of the bureaucratic distance it created. Meanwhile the apparently looser intertwining of the state and the in some ways precapitalist economic activities in Greece proved to be more pervasive. This has kept alive the mentality that public goods are exchangeable and the attitude that rules are negotiable.

Beyond the intertwining with the state, the leading classes in Greece developed links to the masses through politics that the Swedish aristocracy and later the bourgeoisie never succeeded in developing. In Greece, the political reforms changed the power relations between the leading classes and the citizens very early on. While the power of the aristocracy in Sweden was based on ascription, tradition or corporate privilege, the traditional power of the Greek nobles had to be
transformed into political power based on the votes of the electorate. In a society with a population with a low organizational capacity at a time when the knowledge of mass organization was in its embryonic state internationally, the only available way to do it was through the family. A social organization which, in spite of local variations in its structure, has always played an important role in the life of its members and in the social life in modern Greece. Or as Nikiforos Diamandouros (1984:59) has pointed out, the family was the major social actor, which operated on multiple levels and fulfilled many economic, social, military and political functions.

One of the main realms in which the Greek leading classes changed their orientations was that of the state. Another was the family. As many commentators have observed, the fight for liberation weakened the position of the nobles, with many of them losing large parts of their fortune during the war. This turned them inwards toward the family, the major "capital" at their disposal at that time. With politics as an imperative for survival and kinship as the only existing organizational device, extensive family coalitions were built using the quite widespread institutions of adoption, marriage, fraternization and godfatherhood (Petropulos, 1985:69-73).

Initially these family coalitions were horizontal. The extension of suffrage created the imperative for expansion at a time when the weak state did not have the organizational capacity to enlarge its scope and establish direct relations with its citizens. At the interstices between the state and the local communities, the system of family coalitions found fertile ground in which to develop in a more vertical manner, creating hierarchies of families with quite unequal power resources, but also relations of mutual dependence. Families at the top of the hierarchy got their power through their intertwining with the state and access to its goods and those at the bottom through their capacity to aggregate and dispose of the votes of the members. But as families at the bottom were dependent upon the families at the top to get access to the state, the families at the top could not secure their position without the political support of those at the bottom.
As well as the family, villages became units for interest aggregation in Greece. Local cultures were never damaged by agricultural reforms, as they were in Sweden. Rather, they were strengthened. At the same time, class divisions between the peasants were weakened by the distribution of the cultivated land to all peasants, thereby creating a relatively homogenous village population with strong local identities. At the same time, this population was one of illiterates with a low organizational capacity and without the means to create independent peasant organizations; hence, in many parts of Greece, citizenship became relational and mediated, materializing through family networks or political parties and not as a direct relation between the state and the citizen.

Family played an important role in Sweden too, but in a different way. For instance, it was not unusual that positions in state authorities passed from one generation to the next in the same family. The historian Per Frohnert (1993) reports that during the Gustavian period (1773-1809), 75 per cent of kronofogdar (leading state employees at the county level) were sons of kronofogdar. He also reports widespread kinship relations between civil servants. Torbjörn Nilsson (1997) identified many sons and fathers working together in central state authorities throughout the nineteenth century and many positions that passed from fathers to sons or to other relatives. To my knowledge, no social group in Greece ever succeeded in establishing such exclusivity over state positions.

Whilst this was going on the delayed political reforms in Sweden did not create the imperative to expand and establish bonds with civil life outside the state. Moreover, it would have been difficult to do so because the family and kinship were rather weak as social institutions and it would have been almost impossible to establish a social link between state positions and the entire population on the basis of extended kinship relations. A simple comparison of the household structures in villages in the two countries is quite telling in this respect: Whilst in the village of Syrrako in Greece, 39 percent of the households were extended families (Psychogios,
1987:106), in the parish of Dala in Sweden, only seven percent of them were extended families and, amongst the proletarianized peasants, the extended family was almost non existent as a social institution (Winberg, 1997:193). Thus there was neither the imperative to create, nor the possibility of creating links between the leading élites and the entire population by using kinship as a medium.

Furthermore, the possibility to create bonds between the entire population and the leading élites on the basis of strong local identities was eliminated. I mentioned the agricultural reforms earlier. While agricultural reforms in Greece redistributed the arable land, they did not change the social structure of the villages. The Swedish agricultural reforms concentrated the land, but the reform of lagastkifte changed the village structure dramatically too by moving the houses out to the estates (Helmfrid, 1961). In this way, the local cultures were seriously damaged and the characteristically large geographic distances found in Sweden became social distances too (Thörnberg, 1912:77). And later, as migration patterns became a mixture of mild coerced migration and career migration, the inhabitants of the cities became rather anonymous in the sociological meaning of the term as described by Georg Simmel ([1902-3], 1950) and Louis Wirth (1938). Thus the state could recruit civil servants without being interwoven in social networks and the input received by the already distanced bureaucracy consisted of atomized individuals (aggregated in categorical terms). It could therefore relatively easy transform peoples’ concerns into bureaucratic cases and, as the vast majority of the population were able to read and write and could understand the use of general principles underlying the handling of their cases, the need for political and other mediation was eliminated.

In Greece both the kinship and the social structure of the villages remained intact. As a consequence, urbanization became a mixture of chain migration and circular migration and mainly affected the social structure of the cities, prohibiting atomization of their inhabitants. In this respect, Greek cities can be described as “cities of peasants” and their inhabitants as “urban
villagers” the meaning of which is that a high level of social cohesion exists in the cities based on interwoven networks and a high level of primary contact with familiar faces (see Gans, [1962], 1982; Pahl, 1968). As bureaucracy was built near or with people coming from these extensive social networks, it became deeply embedded in social relations based on kinship and strong local identities. It was even difficult to transform the matters of the citizens into depersonalized administrative cases. In an attempt to solve these problems, several institutional devices were used, but most of them without effect. Instead, their major, but unintended consequence was to reinforce the bureaucratic indifference of the already legal-formalistic Greek state, giving the political entrepreneurs more space to mediate between the citizen and the indifferent bureaucracy and thus reproduce the need for clientelism (compare this with the work of Robert Merton, 1968, pp. 126-136).

**Some theoretical implications**

Although the question posed in the title is formulated in a counterfactual manner, this chapter seeks to give answers to questions stated in factual terms: under what conditions will a predominantly universalistic state emerge rather than become embedded in social relations or intertwined with political formations? The rationale here is quite simple: If one wants to question why something did not happen, one can benefit from seeking an explanation to why something else happened instead. And in trying to explain why something materialized, it can be helpful to find an explanation for what has not happened. One way to approach such problems from a historical comparative perspective is to give attention to the suppressed alternatives and understand the “success” of some historical alternatives by placing them at the intersections of trajectories with different temporalities (see Aminzade, 1992:466) or as Charles Tilly elegantly noted “when things happen within a sequence affects how they happen” (Tilly, 1984:14, emphasis in the original). In this chapter I have devoted some attention to the suppressed alternatives by pointing to the particularistic elements in the early Swedish state and the universalistic ambitions that were
present in the process of Greek state formation from the start. Using the idea of the social landscape (Ahrne, 1990, 1994), I have tried to understand the historical outcomes by placing them in the trajectories of states, families, enterprises and voluntary associations.

Some years ago Martin Shefter published his Political Parties and the State (Shefter, 1994). Shefter’s work follows a similar logic of comparison when he tries to understand the emergence of patronage parties in the United States by comparing the different sequences of development between the state and political parties in the United States and some European countries. By using an institutional or polity centered approach, Shefter criticizes earlier sociological interpretations of political patronage in the United States where the demand side of the phenomenon was overemphasized. The strategy political parties adopt is not totally constrained by the characteristics of the voters, argues Shefter (1994:25, 59). Instead he turns the attention onto the supply side of patronage at the time political parties were being formed. If the parties had mobilized a broad electorate before bureaucratic autonomy was established, they had the option of using the resources of the state in clientelist exchanges. Parties, grounded after a bureaucratic autonomy had been created, or developed outside the political system, did not have this option available in their formative years. Thus they were bound to become principle parties.

By turning the old arguments upside-down Shefter’s approach sheds light on relations between central conglomerates in social life, established because of the different sequences of development in different countries. The approach is a healthy corrective to the old “sociological” approaches to the study of patronage in the United States, and also to its social anthropological equivalents to the study of clientelism in Europe. The parts of this chapter dealing with the relations between the realm of the state and the realm of politics are in line with Shefter’s argument. However this study includes more complicated sequences of development in an attempt to integrate the previously mentioned temporality arguments from the neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian discussions on the state. The analysis here seeks the answers to the same problems
as Shefter's by examining the development of a wide range of state-society relations besides those that are mediated through the development of political parties and are analyzed by Shefter. Against this background I will now discuss how Shefter's arguments might be developed further.

By placing the supply side of clientelism in the intersection between the state and political parties, Shefter gives the impression that state-society relations are shaped by state-party relations and thereby constructs an over politicized conception of these relations. Relations between state and political parties matter, but under what conditions do they do so? As the Swedish case illustrates, a state with direct relations to social life limited the space available for political parties to mediate between state and society. In the Greek case, the delayed expansion of the state left considerable space for political parties to develop strong ties with society and mediate the relations to the distant state. This means that the state-party relations become causally important when the state-society relations are weak and distant. Without available space between state and society, the historical sequence in which parties are established before bureaucratic autonomy is created seems to affect the relations of domination between politics and the state, but the sequence alone is not sufficient to turn politics into clientelism.

Shefter's argument even seems to imply that institutional barriers between the state and the political parties are sufficient to hinder the development of patronage, but as the Greek development illustrates, this is not the case. Given that interests were defined in parochial or kinship terms (the demand side in Shefter's terminology), institutional safeguards to insulate bureaucracy had the contrary effect of creating more distance between the citizen and the state, thereby giving more space to political entrepreneurs to mediate between them. In Sweden, on the other hand, very few institutional devices could work effectively because the state was insulated through the incorporation of social distinctions initially and later through the modernization of society. And it was the early expansion of the state that atomized and modernized its subjects through institutional reforms and high rates of literacy, thereby minimizing the need for
clientelism. This means that the working of institutional safeguards against clientelism in particular, and of political institutions in general, cannot be taken for granted a priori because it seems to be contingent upon broad social processes (even to the demand side of clientelism in Shefter's terminology). Although the history of the states does not seem to correspond perfectly to the history of their societies, the working and the unintended consequences of state organizations cannot be understood without reference to these types of state-society contingencies.

Shefter makes some very important points by elucidating upon the supply side of political patronage through the use of metaphors about and analogies to the market. From the sociology of markets, we learn that demand and supply are like hands shaking each other.\(^7\) Not only do we need to study both sides, but we also need to understand how they meet each other. It seems to me, for instance, that the continuance and reproduction of clientelist practices in Greece has to do with the strong institutional and social bonds that constitute the tissue of social life, connect the supply and demand side of clientelism and constantly reinforce each other. In Sweden, on the other hand, it is not the absence of the supply of patronage that explains the absence of clientelism in modern times, but the fact that supply (patronage in the early Swedish state) and demand could never become connected with each other by strong links because of the different sequence of development. Thus the practice of patronage remained limited to an small segment of the social life, without any possibility of it expanding to the entire society.

We shall now turn our attention to these links by using concepts from relational sociology as developed by Charles Tilly (1998). Tilly starts with five elementary social configurations – chain, hierarchy, triad, organization and categorical pair – and studies how different combinations

\(^7\) I am indebted to Richard Swedberg for turning my attention to this old weberian argument.
produce, cement and change durable inequality (Tilly, 1998:48). For the sake of simplicity I will conflate chain, hierarchy and triad to one configuration here, a complex network. I will then add another configuration, atomized and anonymous individuals, in the sociological meaning of the term. Thus we have four elementary configurations: atomized individuals, complex networks, organizations and categorical pairs. These elementary figurations can combine in two general ways: combinations of the same sort and combinations of a different kind. Most organizations, and, between them, states, are like mosaics that interweave with these configurations connecting organizational life and social life in a multitude of ways. At different times the combinations that are available are rather limited because of sequential phenomena and the Swedish and Greek states became interwoven with different configurations.

The Swedish state was initially built on complex networks located on one side of categorical pairs. The incumbents of state positions were connected by strong links with class, but not with society. Thus a social distinction even became an organizational distinction, and the state could establish direct relations to society without running the risk of being exposed to network sabotage. A state with particularistic relations to could be universalistic at the same time in its relations to society, cynically reminding us that a universalistic state is not necessarily a democratic one (cf. Levy, 1996). In the course of time, the categorical pairs, which were basically the aristocratic distinctions the Swedish state was built upon, lost their meaning, but the bureaucratic distance they created remained there and was not undermined by social pressures. Someone could make arguments about historical legacies, pointing to inertial tendencies that characterize social institutions, by stating that, once created, institutions tend to sustain themselves. However from the analysis here it seems reasonable to argue that the perpetuation of the universalistic traits was contingent upon two other social processes: the creation of organizations promoting categorical interests in society and the modernization of the individuals.
Thus the embryo of patronage could not find a glade in the Swedish social landscape in which to develop into mass clientelism.

But it did in Greece, although particularism never was institutionalized formally in Greece as it had been in Sweden prior to 1809, or in practice at work, as for the most part of the nineteenth century. One part of the answer to this paradox can be found in Shefter’s argument: The opposite sequence of development in Greece to that in Sweden meant that politics and state became intertwined in Greece, placing politics in a dominant position vis-à-vis the state. This was coincident with the slow and uneven expansion of the state and a modest modernization of the social life. In the interstices between state and social life, two sets of analytically distinct – but in reality mutually interchangeable and in many cases overlapping – complex networks developed: social networks connecting families and the distant state through kinship, and political networks that made the same connection, but in a political fashion. In contrast to what was the case in Sweden, where these networks connected the state and a slowly disappearing class, in Greece these networks not only connected the state with class, but also with the entire social life. While in Sweden the realms of state, politics and the social life became differentiated with relatively clear-cut organizational boundaries, in Greece these realms became partly overlapping and even intertwined with strong social ties. These ties also prohibited the atomization of the individuals and the full development of categorical interests. They constituted the social ground for clientelism and made the universalistic tendencies in the Greek state, for long periods, look like islands in a sea of particularistic networks.
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